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"All men are liars."
-Psalms 116:11
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the perennial questions in Evidence scholarship is
whether Evidence law has an organizing principle.' If such a princi-
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis; former Chair, Evidence Section,
American Association of Law Schools.
1. See Ronald J. Allen, The Explanatory Value ofAnalyzing Codifications by Reference to
Organizing Principles Other Than Those Employed in the Codification, 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
1080 (1985).
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ple2 exists, the principle would have great utility. To begin with, the
principle could function as an explanatory framework,3 helping us to
better understand4 individual evidentiary rules. Once a worker appre-
ciates the grand architectural design of a structure, the role of each
building block becomes more understandable. Moreover, the discov-
ery of such a principle would better enable us to critique particular
evidentiary rules: it would act as a rationalizing principle.5 When an
individual rule deviated from that rationale, the rule would be a likely
candidate for reconsideration and revision. Finally, in the Grand
Tradition of the common law, 6 if the rationale of that organizing prin-
ciple were discredited by empirical research or on some other basis,
there would be a strong case for the wholesale reform of Evidence
law.
Until recently, the received orthodoxy was that the organizing
principle of Evidence law was a fear that lay jurors would misuse cer-
tain types of evidence. Two of the giants of Evidence law, Thayer,7
and later, Wigmore,8 championed the so-called jury control princi-
ple. 9 They urged the notion that rules such as the hearsay doctrine
reflect the common-law judges' fear that untrained jurors will attach
undue weight to particular kinds of evidence such as un-cross-
examined testimony. However, even giants can err. Recent historical
scholarship indicates that Thayer and Wigmore overstated the extent
to which that fear influenced the evolution of evidentiary doctrine.' 0
More importantly, as Professor Dale Nance ably demonstrated in an
often-cited 1988 article, the jury control hypothesis has limited
explanatory power; the hypothesis simply does not rationalize many
accepted evidentiary rules." I
In addition to attacking the jury control principle, Professor
Nance proposed an alternative hypothesis: the best evidence princi-
ple. Nance contended that the common-law courts were vitally con-
cerned about the quality of evidence.' 2 Nance conceived of the
2. For a discussion of the difference between a principle and a rule, see generally
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-28 (1977).
3. See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 294-95 (1988).
4. Id. at 270.
5. Id. at 248.
6. See PAUL J. MISHKIN & CLARENCE MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CASE AND STATUTE LAW 88-89 (1965).
7. Nance, supra note 3, at 278-79.
8. Id. at 277.
9. Id. at 229.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 281-84.
12. Id. at 276.
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principle as a doctrine squarely within the rationalist tradition."
According to his hypothesis, common-law judges shaped evidentiary
doctrine with a preference for the epistemically best,' 4 reasonably
available"5 evidence. As Professor Nance correctly pointed out, the
best evidence principle can easily serve as a unifying idea' 6 that ani-
matesI7 the best evidence, opinion, and hearsay rules.'" Each of those
rules prefers one type of evidence over another: the production of a
document over a paraphrase of the document's contents, a recitation
of fact rather than an opinion, and a witness' live testimony over a
reference to the person's out-of-court statements.' 9 In each case, the
former type of evidence is preferred because it is deemed better or
more trustworthy. 20 Furthermore, in each case, the preference yields
when the former type of evidence is unavailable and the latter type of
evidence is demonstrably reliable. 2' Professor Nance contends that
the best evidence principle is superior to the jury control hypothesis
and has greater power as an interpretive device for explaining extant
evidentiary rules.22
The thesis of this article is that while there is substantial merit in
both the jury control and the best evidence hypotheses, neither is the
best organizing principle for Evidence law. For their part, Thayer and
Wigmore were correct in thinking that common-law evidentiary doc-
trine reflects a profound skepticism. However, they misidentified the
primary object of the common-law judges' skepticism: rather than
primarily fearing the misevaluation of evidence by jurors, the judges
were principally concerned about perjury by witnesses. For his part,
Professor Nance is correct in surmising that, in large part, evidentiary
rules are based on a concern about the quality of evidence. However,
the common-law courts were not affirmatively pursuing a rationalist
objective of ensuring the admission of only the best evidence. Instead,
common-law evidence doctrine was driven chiefly by a more pessimis-
13. See generally William Twining, The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in
WELL AND TRULY TRIED 211 (Enid Campbell & Lewis Waller eds., 1982).
14. Nance, supra note 3, at 240.
15. Id. at 241.
16. Id. at 248, 276, 286.
17. Id. at 230.
18. Id. at 286 n.282. As authority for this position, Professor Nance cites the appropriate
passages in RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1986) [hereinafter MATERIALS], the predecessor to RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE
IN THE NINETIES: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND
STATUTES (3d ed. 1991) [hereinafter AGE OF SCIENCE].
19. CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 507-08.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Nance, supra note 3, at 293.
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tic, negative goal, namely, preventing, deterring, and exposing
perjury.
A worst evidence principle-a concern about witness perury-is
the best explanatory hypothesis for the logical structure of Evidence
law. The first section of this article reviews the jury control and best
evidence principles. This section of the article demonstrates the his-
torical weaknesses and limited explanatory power of both principles.
The second section of the article develops the competing worst evi-
dence principle. This section of the article initially marshals the his-
torical proof that in formulating evidentiary rules, the common-law
courts' foremost concern was the prevention and exposure of perjury.
The article then employs the worst evidence principle to explicate
individual evidentiary rules. The worst evidence principle helps
account for more rules and more troublesome features of the rules
than either the jury control or the best evidence principle can ration-
alize. The third and concluding section of the article highlights the
important implications of the identification of the worst evidence
principle for the future reform of evidentiary doctrine.
II. THE INADEQUACY OF THE JURY CONTROL AND BEST
EVIDENCE PRINCIPLES
A. The Jury Control Hypothesis
The traditional hypothesis for the structure of common-law Evi-
dence is that evidentiary rules emerged because of the judges' distrust
of lay jurors' competence.23 Under this hypothesis, judges formulated
the rules with a view toward restraining the irrational behavior of
weak-minded jurors.24 As previously stated, Thayer was a proponent
of this theory. He characterized the common law of Evidence as "the
child of the jury system."'25 Thayer was somewhat hostile to the insti-
tution of the jury,26 and he may have projected that hostility into his
analysis of the origin of the common law of Evidence. Thayer's view
mightily influenced Dean Wigmore.27 One of the leading students of
Wigmore's writings, Professor Peter Tillers, asserts that Wigmore's
doubts about the jury's capacity "inform" Wigmore's treatment of
virtually every branch of Evidence.28
23. See id. at 230, 260, 283.
24. Id. at 229.
25. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 266 (1898).
26. See id. at 534-35 (proposing a reduction in the use of juries).
27. Nance, supra note 3, at 278.
28. 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW xii (1983); see also
Nance, supra note 3, at 277-78.
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However, the jury control hypothesis suffers from several weak-
nesses. First, the hypothesis is at odds with contemporary historical
research,29 especially that of Professor John Langbein. In 1978,
Langbein published his classic article on the evolution of adversary
procedure in criminal trials.30 Langbein focused on developments in
criminal trial procedure in eighteenth-century England. He relied
heavily on the Old Bailey Sessions Papers.31  Although Langbein
found evidence that common-law judges were distrustful of lay jurors,
his findings undercut the assumption that these judges fashioned evi-
dentiary rules as a means of jury control.32 His research indicated
that judges employed other techniques for this purpose, such as judi-
cial comment to the jury33 and outright rejection of jury verdicts. 34 In
Langbein's words, common-law "judges did not need [to resort to]
anything as clumsy as the rules of admissibility to keep juries to
heel.",35
While Langbein mounted a historical case against the jury con-
trol principle, Nance convincingly attacked the principle on the
ground that it has minimal utility as an organizing theory, or at least
less explanatory force than the best evidence principle. 36 He illus-
trates his attack with two well-settled evidentiary requirements, oath
and cross-examination. Nance argues that the jury control hypothesis
fails to rationalize either requirement. He contends, for example, that
"[ijf anything, the jury is more likely to be misled by sworn [perjuri-
ous] testimony .... -3 Nance then points out that when a witness
fails or refuses to answer questions on cross-examination, the case law
permits the trial judge to consider a number of factors in deciding
whether to strike the witness' direct testimony-factors which Nance
believes are "incongruen[t] to any concern about misleading the
jury."' 38 The cases announce, for instance, that if the witness cannot
be cross-examined due to the witness' illness and without any wrong-
doing on the part of the witness' proponent, the judge may allow the
29. Nance, supra note 3, at 229.
30. See John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263
(1978).
31. Id. at 267-72.
32. Id. at 306.
33. Id. at 285.
34. See id. at 291-96.
35. Id. at 306. See generally Stephan Landsman, From Gilbert to Bentham: The
Reconceptualization of Evidence Theory, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1149, 1149-51 (1990).
36. Nance, supra note 3, at 281-83.
37. Id. at 281.
38. Id. at 282.
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direct testimony to stand.39 In Nance's view, the oath and cross-
examination procedures exemplify the many evidentiary rules which
are "hard to reconcile with a jury distrust theory."4°
B. The Best Evidence Hypothesis
At first blush, Professor Nance not only succeeds in undermining
the jury control hypothesis but also constructs a persuasive case for
the alternative best evidence principle. This principle is unquestiona-
bly evident in the writings of Sir Geoffrey Gilbert, the author of one of
the first English evidence treatises.41 In the eighteenth century, it was
Gilbert who wrote that, "The first... and most Signal Rule, in Rela-
tion to Evidence, is this, That a Man must have the utmost Evidence,
the Nature of the Fact is capable of. .. "42 Simply stated, Gilbert
"attempted to subsume the whole of the law under a single principle,
'the best evidence rule.' ,43 In the nineteenth century, Greenleaf fol-
lowed suit and made the best evidence principle a central notion in his
conception of the structure of evidence law. 4
Furthermore, Professor Nance exemplifies the explanatory value
of the best evidence principle. He goes to great length to demonstrate
that the principle stands "behind an impressive array of" evidentiary
rules,45 including both numerous evidentiary requirements (oath,46
cross-examination, 47 personal knowledge, 4 and authentication 49) and
the most prominent preferential exclusionary rules (opinion, hearsay,
and best evidence).5" Professor Nance concludes that all these eviden-
tiary doctrines have "'best evidence' foundation[s]."'
In summary, Nance asserts that the best evidence principle is a
better organizing principle for the common law of evidence than the
traditional jury control hypothesis. In a relative sense, the best evi-
dence principle does appear to be the sounder hypothesis. Yet the
best evidence principle itself has major deficiencies.
One deficiency is historical. In two 1990 articles, Professor
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Landsman, supra note 35, at 1151-52.
42. Id. at 1152 (citing GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 3-4 (1754)).
43. Twining, supra note 13, at 213.
44. Nance, supra note 3, at 248.
45. Id. at 291.
46. Id. at 281.
47. Id. at 282-83.
48. Id. at 285 n.279 (citing CARLSON ET AL., MATERIALS, supra note 18, at 161-73).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 286 n.282 (citing CARLSON ET AL., MATERIALS, supra note 18, at 419-20).
51. Id. at 289.
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Landsman demonstrated that although Gilbert attached overarching
importance to the best evidence principle, 52 other English evidence
writers gradually depreciated the principle.5 After the publication of
Gilbert's treatise in 1754,"4 Thomas Peake, William Evans, S.M. Phil-
lips, and Jeremy Bentham all undertook to write substantial texts or
essays about the common law of Evidence." Although Peake
acknowledged Gilbert's best evidence principle, that principle did not
dominate his text as it had Gilbert's treatise. 6 Evans, who wrote a
few years after Peake, attempted to confine the best evidence principle
to documentary proof.5 7 A decade later, Phillips further diminished
the significance of the best evidence principle.58 In his work, the best
evidence rule does not surface until Chapter VII-176 pages into the
text.59 Finally, Bentham repudiated the best evidence principle as a
basis for excluding testimony. 6°
Furthermore, while the principle may have more explanatory
power than the jury control hypothesis, its explanatory value is also
limited. Professor Nance concedes that the best evidence principle
cannot rationalize the privilege rules.6' The raison d'etre of a privilege
is the promotion of an extrinsic social policy such as the facilitation of
communication between client and attorney or patient and physi-
cian.62 Privileges do not rest on considerations of the quality of the
evidence in question. Quite the contrary is true; the invocation of a
privilege can result in the suppression of highly relevant, trustworthy
evidence.63
Likewise, the best evidence principle falls short of explaining
some of the most troublesome aspects of the common law of Evi-
dence. By way of example, consider one of the most embarrassing
features of common law evidence: the gross inconsistency between
the liberal admissibility of character evidence on a credibility theory
and its virtual exclusion on the historical merits.
A hypothetical case will suffice to explain this inconsistency.
52. Landsman, supra note 35, at 1152-53.
53. Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in
Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 596 (1990).
54. See Landsman, supra note 35, at 1152.
55. Id. at 1160-85.
56. Id. at 1161.
57. Id. at 1162.
58. Id. at 1163.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1176-77.
61. Nance, supra note 3, at 229, 294-95.
62. CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 731-34.
63. Id. at 731.
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Assume that an accused, charged with perjury, testifies at his trial.
Once the accused testifies, his credibility becomes a fact of conse-
quence in issue in the case. To impeach the accused, the prosecutor
may then call a second witness to testify that the accused has a repu-
tation as an untruthful person. 6M The trial judge would admit the tes-
timony on a credibility theory and, on timely request, the judge would
give the jury a limiting instruction 65 to the effect that they could con-
sider the testimony only in deciding whether the accused testified
truthfully on the stand.
Suppose, however, that the prosecutor argued alternatively that
the testimony should be received on the historical merits of the case to
increase the probability that the accused committed the charged act of
perjury. Unless the accused has placed his character in issue,66 the
judge would summarily reject the prosecutor's argument.
The irony is that in both variations of the hypothetical, the pros-
ecutor is relying on essentially the same theory of logical relevance:
introducing reputation testimony to prove the accused's character
and, in turn, employing character as circumstantial proof of con-
duct.67 In one case, the prosecutor argues that the accused's charac-
ter trait of untruthfulness strengthens the inference that the accused's
current testimony is perjurious. In the other case, the prosecutor con-
tends that the character trait increases the likelihood that the accused
committed the charged offense. In both cases, the prosecutor is
attempting to use the accused's character trait as a predictor of con-
duct on a specific occasion. Yet the common law treats the two cases
"very differently. ' ' 68 The differential treatment seems indefensible,
because there is no empirical evidence that there is greater consistency
in the character trait of untruthfulness than in other traits.69 For our
purposes, the telling point is that the best evidence principle offers no
possible justification for the disparate treatment of character on a
credibility theory and the historical merits. Why would the use of
character evidence comport with the principle when the evidence is
offered for credibility purposes but run afoul of the principle when
64. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3), 405, 608(a). See generally Richard C. Wydick, Character
Evidence: A Guided Tour of the Grotesque Structure, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 123, 173-81
(1987).
65. FED. R. EVID. 105.
66. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). See generally Wydick, supra note 64, at 139-50.
67. See CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 384-86, 451-52.
68. Id. at 385.
69. Id. at 385-86 (collecting the psychological studies); Susan M. Davies, Evidence of
Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 514, 521
(1991); see also Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian[l?]
Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 645-54 (1991).
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offered on the merits? As this hypothetical illustrates, when we turn
to some of the more problematic evidentiary rules, the best evidence
principle fails as a rationalizing theory.
III. THE CASE FOR THE WORST EVIDENCE PRINCIPLE
The worst evidence principle is that the common law of Evidence
was shaped by and is largely explicable in terms of the early judges'
desire to prevent, deter, and expose the worst type of evidence, per-
jury. This principle not only has solid historical support, it has more
extensive explanatory power than either the jury control or the best
evidence hypothesis.
A. The Historical Support for the Worst Evidence Principle
In the eighteenth century, England witnessed the birth of an
elaborate system of common-law evidentiary rules.7° It is true that
the advent occurred at roughly the same time as the Enlightenment or
Age of Reason. 7 The rationalists had "unquestioning confidence in
the power of... logic" to solve human problems. 72 The coincidence
of the Age of Reason with the emergence of the body of evidence law
initially seems to cut in favor of the best evidence principle with its
rationalist grounding. However, it must also be remembered that the
common-law judges who fashioned these evidentiary rules had
already been exposed to the philosophy of Hobbes, "one of the most
influential men of his day among persons who were open to ideas. '73
Hobbes had a less than idealistic conception of human behavior.74
Hobbes stated that without a strong government to keep men "in
awe," the human condition would degenerate into "a war... of every
man against every man."' 75 Embracing the skeptical spirit of the Ren-
aissance,76 he viewed human beings as "motivated by complete selfish-
ness .... 77
This pessimistic view of human motivation was probably in the
back of the minds of many of the judges who gave birth to the com-
70. Landsman, supra note 53, at 537-43; Landsman, supra note 35, at 1149; John H.
Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983); Nance, supra note 3, at 248.
71. WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY 254 (1962).
72. Id.
73. ALBUREY CASTELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY 106 (2d ed.
1963).
74. Id. at I11.
75. Id. at 360.
76. DURANT, supra note 71, at 207.
77. CASTELL, supra note 73, at 106.
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mon law of Evidence. Any judge who subscribed to the Hobbesian
philosophy would understandably be on guard against witness per-
jury. More importantly, a number of historical developments during
the eighteenth century riveted the attention of both the public and the
legal community on the problem of perjury.
Crown witnesses. The most pressing crime problem facing the
urban centers in England during the eighteenth century was robberies
and other thefts committed by gangs.78 Gang members were hard-
ened, professional criminals.79 A "mainstay" of the government's
battle against the gangs was the crown witness system. 80 After a gang
member was arrested, a magistrate could designate that member a
crown witness.81 If the arrestee was willing to betray fellow gang
members by testifying against them,82 the magistrate would promise
the arrestee nonprosecution.8 3 The magistrate lacked a formal pardon
power,84 but evidently, in practice, nonprosecution promises were
generally kept. 5
Hobbes would undoubtedly have regarded the crown witness
practice as proof of his theory of selfish human motivation. The prac-
tice gave rise to a cycle of betrayal. 86 Over the course of a long crimi-
nal career, a given individual might serve as a crown witness to betray
his colleagues and later be betrayed.87 If the police arrested several
gang members, they would compete to be designated as the crown
witness.88 When the offense was a capital crime, the competition
became a life-or-death race to win the magistrate's favor.89
In Professor Langbein's words, this practice obviously "labored
under a material incentive to commit perjury .... "90 Given the large
number of capital offenses, the crown witness system could easily pro-
voke perjury.91 The legal community began to appreciate that when
the prosecution relied on a crown witness, there was good reason to
suspect perjury.92 There were cases in which crown witnesses suc-
78. Langbein, supra note 70, at 85, 105.
79. Id. at 84.
80. Id. at 94.
81. Id. at 85, 95.
82. Id. at 84.
83. Id. at 92, 94.
84. Id. at 94-95.
85. Id. at 95.
86. Id. at 86.
87. Id. at 84-85.
88. Id. at 88.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 97.
91. Id. at 114.
92. Id. at 105.
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cessfully framed other suspects. 93 Innocent defendants were some-
times convicted on the basis of crown witness testimony. 94 These
incidents became public scandals. 95 The contemporary press sensa-
tionalized the incidents, 96 and large mobs sometimes attended the pil-
lorying of crown witnesses who had perjured themselves and were
found out.97 Some particularly notorious scandals remained in the
public eye for years. 98
These scandals had a profound influence on the judges who sat
during the formative era of the common law of Evidence; these inci-
dents were "much in the air" 99 and "loomed large" in the judges'
minds."° In their courts, they became accustomed to hearing the
defense level the accusation that the crown witness would " 'say any-
thing to save his own life' ",O' or was endeavoring to "purchase[
impunity by falsely accusing others."' 12 Judges made mention of the
scandals in their own writings. 103 In short, judges became gravely
concerned that the crown witness system encouraged perjury."0 4
Langbein concludes that the rise of the mandatory corroboration
requirement-"[t]he [f]irst [r]ule of [e]vidence" 10 -was at least in
part a judicial response to that concern.10 6
Thief catchers. Another historical development during this
period was the creation of a cadre of professional thief catchers. 0 7 To
curb the growing problem of stealing, the Parliament passed a series
of statutes offering rewards to people who aided in the prosecution of
thieves.10 8 Many people went into the business of catching thieves."
Such conduct seemed to further support the Hobbesian view of
human motivation. The public came to view thief catchers as
93. Id. at 97, 108-10.
94. Id. at 106, 108-10.
95. Id. at 105-06.
96. Id. at 112.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 105.
100. Id. at 86.
101. Id. at 97 (quoting OBSP (Apr./May 1756, #203), at 169, 170).
102. Id. (quoting Regina v. Farler, 8 C. & P. 106, 108, 173 Eng. Rep. 418, 419 (Worcester
assizes 1837)), cited in 4 J.H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2037, at 358, § 2059, at 362.
103. Id. at 114.
104. Id. at 2.
105. Id. at 96.
106. Id. at 96-103.
107. Landsman, supra note 53, at 573.
108. Landsman, supra note 53, at 573; Langbein, supra note 70, at 106.
109. Landsman, supra note 53, at 573.
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"entirely self-interested individual[s]." 110 Thief catchers pursued
their business for profit rather than out of any sense of civic responsi-
bility.II' At the trials of their arrestees, they became both witnesses
and advocates for the prosecution. 12
As in the case of the crown witnesses, there were scandals involv-
ing thief catchers." 3 It became clear that some thief catchers had
fabricated testimony against innocent defendants.' "4 A few thief
catchers were even prosecuted and jailed for their perjury.' I
Like the crown witness scandals, the thief catcher scandals made
the legal community even more conscious of the problem of per-
jury.' 16 Commentators such as Evans referred to the "suspicion of
fabrication ... commonly attendant upon" professional thief catch-
ers." 7 Judges and jurors alike became skeptical of prosecution cases
resting primarily on thief catcher testimony."' The defense often
raised the spectre of perjury" 9 and would attack a thief catcher wit-
ness as a "liar."' 20 As a general proposition, the trial judges gave the
defense wide latitude on cross-examination to expose the witness'
motivation to lie. 12' Acquittals in these cases were frequent. 122 Just
as Professor Langbein characterizes the corroboration requirement as
a partial response to the crown witness scandals, Professor Landsman
concludes that notorious thief catcher misconduct played an impor-
tant role in spurring evidentiary reform in eighteenth-century
England. 23
The public and judges did not think that perjury was confined to
criminal cases. In 1676, the Parliament enacted the original Statute
of Frauds for civil Contract disputes.' 24 The preamble to the statute
stated that there were "many fraudulent practices, which are com-
monly endeavoured to be upheld by perjury and subornation of per-
110. Id. at 577.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 576.
113. Id. at 580.
114. Id. at 573, 577.
115. Id. at 579.
116. Id. at 577.
117. Id. at 577 n.406 (citing William D. Evans, Appendix XVI-On the Law of Evidence, in
2 M. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS 225 (William D.
Evans trans., 1826)).
118. Id at 567 n.354.
119. Id. at 541.
120. Id at 553.
121. Id. at 555, 579.
122. Id. at 576.
123. Id at 577, 580.
124. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 6.1, at 370 (1982).
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jury." 125 Preambles to earlier statutes had included assertions such as
the statement that "perjury ... horribly continues and daily increases
in the kingdom." 126
Professor Nance himself acknowledges that some of the older
texts placed a conspicuous emphasis on the prevention of perjury and
fraud. 127 Judges and commentators alike assumed not only that per-
jury was rampant but also that perjury was the most common cause of
erroneous trial testimony. 28  As the following subsection demon-
strates, those assumptions pervade the common law of Evidence-to
an even greater extent than the assumptions underlying either the jury
control or the best evidence principle.
B. The Superior Explanatory Power of the Worst
Evidence Principle
As we shall now see, the vast majority of the common-law evi-
dentiary rules reflect a concern about witness perjury. Most of the
rules are explicable in terms of a concerted judicial effort to prevent,
deter, and expose perjury and allied evils such as forgery and fraud. 129
1. THE COMPETENCY OF PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES
In evidence law, the threshold question is whether the person
called to the stand is competent to testify as a witness. Before turning
to the question of the permissible content of the person's proposed
testimony, the judge must decide whether the person is qualified to
give any testimony at all in the case. 130 Both the early common-law
competency rules and their modern vestiges reflect the worst evidence
principle.
In addition to barring certain mentally disordered persons from
testifying,' 3 ' the common law rendered certain categories of persons
per se incompetent as witnesses: interested persons, 32 persons who
had previously suffered specified felony convictions, 133 and persons
125. Id.
126. E.g., 38Edw. 3,ch. 12 (1363); 34Edw. 3,ch. 8(1360); 5 Edw. 3,ch. 10 (1331), cited in
RONALD CARLSON, EDWARD IMWINKELRIED & EDWARD KIONKA, MATERIALS FOR THE
STUDY OF EVIDENCE 551 (2d ed. 1986).
127. Nance, supra note 3, at 257-58.
128. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Importance of the Memory Factor in Analyzing the
Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: A Lesson Slowly Learnt-and Quickly Forgotten, 41 FLA. L.
REV. 215, 219-20 (1989).
129. See Landsman, supra note 35, at 1179.
130. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 61-69 (4th ed. 1992).
131. See id. § 62.
132. Nance, supra note 3, at 255; see also Landsman, supra note 35, at 1154, 1165.
133. Landsman, supra note 35, at 1154, 1165.
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with aberrant religious beliefs. 134 The common law did so on the the-
ory that the integrity of these persons was questionable. 35 Bentham
put the matter bluntly when he wrote that the early common law alto-
gether prevented these persons from testifying because it presumed
that persons in the prohibited categories were "liars."'1 36
Although modem evidence law has abandoned most of these
exclusions, some vestiges of the ancient competency rules survive; and
like the antecedent exclusions, the vestiges support the worst evidence
hypothesis.
One vestige is the fact that in a few jurisdictions, persons who
have previously been convicted of perjury or subornation of perjury
remain incompetent. 137
Another remnant of the early rules is that in roughly half the
states there are still survivor's evidence or dead man statutes. 138
These statutes generally provide that in certain types of civil actions
against a decedent's estate, the surviving party to a transaction such
as a contract may not testify adversely to the estate. These statutes
were enacted as safeguards against perjury. 139 Death had silenced the
decedent and thereby deprived the estate of the most effective means
of rebutting the survivor's testimony, and it was thought that the sur-
vivor would be tempted to resort to perjury.14
Still another vestige of the early competency rules is the require-
ment that the prospective witness take an oath before testifying.1 4'
The principal purpose of this requirement is to deter the witness from
committing perjury. I42 Taking the oath pricks the witness' con-
science 4 3 and make the person more aware of the consequences of
untruthful testimony. In that manner, the oath supposedly reduces
the likelihood of perjury. 44
2. THE LOGICAL RELEVANCE OF THE PROPOSED TESTIMONY
If the proposed witness is competent, the focus shifts from the
witness' personal qualifications to the substance of the contemplated
testimony. To be admissible, all evidence must be logically rele-
134. Id. at 1154.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1177-78.
137. MCCORMICK, supra note 130, § 64.
138. CARLSON ET AL., MATERIALS, supra note 18, at 176.
139. Id.
140. MCCORMICK, supra note 130, § 65.
141. FED. R. EVID. 601, 603.
142. FED. R. EVID. 603 advisory committee's note; see also Nance, supra note 3, at 281.
143. Landsman, supra note 35, at 1165.
144. See People v. Haeberlin, 77 Cal. Rptr. 553, 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
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vant.'45 The common law insisted that the proponent of an item of
evidence establish the logical relevance of the evidence in two
respects.
First, the common law demanded that the testimony be material
to the facts of consequence in the case. In Thayer's words, this
requirement is "not so much a rule of evidence as a presupposition
involved in the very conception of a rational system of evidence
.... "146 When the proponent offers an item of evidence at trial, the
judge queries the proponent to determine what the proponent claims
the item to be.' 4 The judge then asks this question: If the item is
what the proponent claims it to be, does the item increase or decrease
the probability of the existence of any fact in issue in the case? 4 a If
the item would affect the balance of probabilities, the item satisfies the
first dimension of logical relevance. This dimension is sometimes
styled the facial relevance of the evidence. 49
However, the common-law judges were not content with a show-
ing of facial relevance; in the case of exhibits, they also demanded
proof of the underlying relevance or authenticity.1 0 For example,
when the proponent offers a letter and claims that it is the contract
offer authored by the defendant, the proponent must prove up that
claim.' 5' Most courts refer to that mandate as the requirement for
authentication. 52 Both the existence and tenor of that requirement
comport with the worst evidence principle.
Thayer was correct in characterizing the facial logical relevance
doctrine as a dictate of any rational evidence system; if the purpose of
a trial is to resolve a controversy, the only proof admitted at that trial
should be evidence related to the underlying factual disputes. In con-
trast, there is no logical necessity for the underlying logical relevance
doctrine. Quite to the contrary, in "everyday" life, if we receive a
letter, we tend to take it at face value; we presume authenticity and
dispense with extrinsic proof of genuineness.' 53 However, the com-
mon-law judges were concerned about the possibility of perjury and
the allied evil of forgery. They consequently imposed the authentica-
tion requirement as "a ... check on the perpetration of fraud.' 54 It
145. FED. R. EVID. 402.
146. THAYER, supra note 25, at 264-65.
147. CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 189-98.
148. Id. at 190, 197.
149. Id. at 203; United States v. Southland, 700 F.2d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 1983).
150. See generally CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 203-05, 207-19.
151. See FED. R. EvID. 901.
152. CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 204.
153. MCCORMICK, supra note 130, § 218.
154. Id.
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is, of course, possible that accidentally or as a joke, a third party will
create a letter which purports to be a contract offer relevant to the
instant suit, but that possibility is remote. Realistically, it is much
more likely that any such letter would be a deliberate forgery. Thus,
the very existence of the general authentication doctrine fits into the
pattern of the worst evidence principle.
The specific features of the application of the doctrine to certain
types of exhibits also fall into the same pattern. The doctrine applies
to both audiotapes'" and motion pictures.5 6 If the proponent claims
that an audiotape represents an accurate recording of a particular
conversation, the proponent must establish that claim. Or when the
proponent claims that a motion picture faithfully depicts certain
action, again the proponent must prove the claim. In theory, the pro-
ponent can establish such a claim by marshalling any set of circum-
,stantial evidence which would rationally support a permissive
inference of authenticity."' However, in the case of audiotapes and
motion pictures, the common law was more restrictive.158 When the
proponent proffered an audiotape, some courts rigidly insisted on
proof of the custody of the tape.' 59  Several authorities similarly
required proof of custody of the film in the case of motion pictures.6°
In large part, the courts added these foundational requisites out of
fear of deliberate tampering and manipulation with the exhibit.' 6' In
this light, the imposition of these requirements was based on the skep-
ticism and concern about perjury at the core of the worst evidence
principle. 162
3. LEGAL IRRELEVANCE RESTRICTIONS ON THE ADMISSION OF
LOGICALLY RELEVANT EVIDENCE
Assume that the proposed witness is competent and the contem-
155. See generally CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 266-68.
156. See generally id. at 275-80.
157. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b), 901(a).
158. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6
REV. LITIG. 129, 143 (1987).
159. Edwin Conrad, Magnetic Recordings in the Courts, 40 VA. L. REV. 23, 34-35 (1954);
Amelia K. Sherman, A Foundational Standard for the Admission of Sound Recordings into
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 52 So. CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1279-80 (1979); see also United States
v. Biggins, 551 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cianfrani, 448 F. Supp. 1102, 1103 n.2
(E.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v.
McKeever, 169 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 271 F.2d 669 (2d Cir.
1959).
160. Pierre R. Paradis, The Celluloid Witness, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 235, 238 (1965).
161. See Conrad, supra note 159, at 33-34; Paradis, supra note 160, at 240, 254; Sherman,
supra note 159, at 1277-78.
162. CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 277.
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plated testimony is logically relevant. The showing of the logical rele-
vance of the item of evidence establishes that it possesses some
probative value or worth in the case. However, before deciding
whether to admit the item, the common-law judges inquired whether
the logically relevant item should nevertheless be excluded as being
"legally irrelevant;" '163 that is, the judges balanced that probative
value against incidental probative dangers such as prejudice and dis-
traction. Even if the item was logically pertinent, the judge might
exclude the item on the ground that the item was prejudicial in the
technical sense that it might tempt the jury to decide the case on an
improper basis.' That risk of prejudice is one of the major reasons
for the limitations on the admissibility of bad character evidence.
165
A juror might find a litigant's character so repulsive that the juror
would be inclined at a subconscious level to vote against that litigant
even if the case against the litigant were weak. Likewise, in her dis-
cretion the judge might bar the item on the theory that its admission
would divert the jury from the central issues in the case. 166 This dan-
ger of distraction is one of the principal rationales for the restrictions
on credibility evidence. 67 The courts fear that if the parties deluge
the jurors with evidence relevant only to the witnesses' credibility, the
jurors will lose sight of the historical merits of the case.161
This discussion gives us the opportunity to revisit one of the most
troublesome aspects of the common law of evidence: the seeming
inconsistency between the liberal admissibility of character evidence
on credibility and its virtually complete exclusion on the historical
merits. As previously stated,169 this inconsistency appears indefen-
sible; there is no hard evidence that there is greater consistency in the
character trait of untruthfulness than in other traits. Moreover, as
Part I of this article observed, the inconsistency cannot be rational-
ized under either the jury control or the best evidence principle. If the
relevant risk is the danger that the jury will misuse evidence of a
party's bad character and decide the case on an improper basis, the
risk arises whether the judge formally admits the evidence on credibil-
ity or the merits. Likewise, if character is a better, preferred method
of proof on the question of whether a witness is lying, it is difficult to
163. Id. at ch. 16.
164. FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note.
165. CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 449-50.
166. Id. at 317.
167. Id. at 317, 337-38.
168. Id. at 317.
169. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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understand why character should be forbidden on the historical
merits.
However, under the worst evidence principle, the seeming incon-
sistency disappears; the principle makes it easily understandable why
the early judges admitted character evidence so readily when it was
offered on a credibility theory of logical relevance. The judges were
acutely interested in both deterring and exposing perjury.17 0 The lib-
eral admissibility of character evidence of untruthfulness advances
both objectives. Initially, a norm of liberal admissibility should dis-
courage the commission of perjury. If a person is considering com-
mitting perjury, he must take into account the impeachment
techniques at the disposal of the opposing attorney; he may calculate
the risk that the opposing attorney will successfully unmask the per-
jury. Further, if the person decided to perpetrate perjury-and the
common-law judges assumed that such decisions were common 171 _
the opposing attorney needed forensic tools to counteract the perjury.
While some impeachment techniques target deficiencies in the wit-
ness' perceptual ability or memory, 172 character evidence of untruth-
fulness is the technique best suited to unmasking perjury.171
Whatever form the evidence takes (reputation,174 opinion,175 or spe-
cific acts176), the ultimate inference from the character evidence is the
witness' commission of perjury. 17 1 In short, the courts' heightened
concern about perjury explains why the common-law judges were
especially receptive to character evidence on a credibility theory. The
worst evidence principle rationalizes the inconsistency which con-
founds the jury control and best evidence principles.
4. THE PREFERENTIAL EXCLUSIONARY RULES (BEST EVIDENCE,
OPINION, AND HEARSAY)
One of Professor Nance's most cogent arguments for the best evi-
dence principle is the principle's power in explaining the best evi-
dence, opinion, and hearsay rules.178 Each rule prefers one type of
evidence over another and, hence, has an obvious " 'best evidence'
foundation."' 79 However, the rules are equally consistent with the
170. Landsman, supra note 35, at 1179.
171. Id. at 1178 ("examples of violation of the oath abounded in the law courts").
172. MCCORMICK, supra note 130, § 44.
173. CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 384-86.
174. FED. R. EVID. 405(a), 608(a).
175. Id.
176. FED. R. EVID. 608(b), 609.
177. CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 385.
178. See Nance, supra note 3, at 286.
179. Id. at 289.
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worst evidence principle. The general structure of each rule furthers
the policies of deterring and exposing perjury. If unscrupulous in-
court witnesses had carte blanche to state conclusory opinions and
relate purported paraphrases of writings, they could perpetrate per-
jury far more easily. In the same vein, if an out-of-court declarant
could be confident that he could level accusations without ever having
to face a cross-examiner in court, the declarant might be emboldened
to foist untruthful hearsay on the court.
However, the preferential rules make it more difficult for the wit-
ness or declarant to perpetrate a fraud on the court. The operative
effect of each rule is to provide the trier of fact with data facilitating
the detection of perjury. The witness cannot simply state a final opin-
ion; the witness must also furnish the trier with some of the underly-
ing, hard factual data. 180 The trier can make his or her own judgment
as to whether the data dictate or are at least consistent with the opin-
ion. Nor can a witness indiscriminately allude to the contents of out-
of-court writings. The witness must ordinarily produce the writing. 81
Its production enables the trier to independently assess the language.
Finally, by virtue of the hearsay rule, an out-of-court declarant may
be forced to appear, testify under oath, and subject himself to cross-
examination in the trier's presence. The appearance and cross-exami-
nation put the trier in a better position to make a more informed deci-
sion as to whether the testimony is truthful or perjurious. Hence, the
general effects of the exclusionary rules are to give any would-be per-
jurer pause and to make it easier for the trier to detect perjury.
Moreover, as in the case of the differential treatment of character
evidence on credibility and the merits, the worst evidence principle
also accounts for particular, troublesome features of the rules which
defy the best evidence principle.
The best evidence rule. Courts 182 and commentators have long
recognized that the best evidence rule rests on a twofold rationale:
"the sanctity of the written word" and fraud prevention.8 3 More
importantly, some of the most controversial aspects of the rule are
best explained by the worst evidence principle. One such aspect is the
early common law's treatment of mechanically prepared copies as sec-
180. FED. R. EVID. 701, 703.
181. FED. R. EViD. ART. X.
182. See, e.g., United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 845 (2d Cir. 1939).
183. David W. MeMorrow, Authentication and the Best Evidence Rule Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 195, 218-19 (1969); see also Harlan B. Rogers, The Best
Evidence Rule, 1945 Wis. L. REV. 278; see generally CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra
note 18, at 546-48.
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ondary evidence.18 4 If the solitary concern were guarding against
innocent errors in transmitting a writing's terms, 8 5 mechanically pre-
pared copies would be treated as preferred, primary evidence; the gen-
eral reliability of mechanical means of reproduction virtually
eliminates the possibility of unintentional mistransmission.' 8 6 The
only satisfactory rationale for the common-law position on these cop-
ies is "the ancillary purpose of fraud prevention."' 187 Thus, in another
"hard" case-a common-law evidentiary rule which had been
severely criticized-the explanatory value of the worst evidence prin-
ciple exceeds that of the best evidence hypothesis.
The opinion prohibition. The traditional restrictions on expert
opinion testimony contain a number of rather peculiar rules. For
example, as in the case of thief catchers, the common-law courts
granted the attorney cross-examining an expert extremely broad lati-
tude. 88 The jury control and best evidence principles are at a loss to
explain why the common law singled out the expert for such special
treatment. Once again, to rationalize the rule, we must fall back to
the worst evidence principle. In the common-law world, there has
long been a widespread perception that many expert witnesses are
venal and willing to manipulate the truth to the advantage of the
attorney who hires and pays them. 89 In civil-law systems, the judge
typically selects the expert. 9 ° However, in common-law countries,
expert testimony has been privatized; ordinarily the experts are cho-
sen by the attorneys representing the parties.' Writing early in the
nineteenth century, Williams Evans charged that in many cases,
experts were little more than advocates themselves. 192 At the turn of
the century, Judge Hand repeated the charge.' 93 In his words, the
nature of the system pressures the expert to become "a hired cham-
184. See MCCORMICK, supra note 130, § 236.
185. See generally Nance, supra note 3, at 259.
186. MCCORMICK, supra note 130, § 236 at 417.
187. Id.
188. State v. Goodrich, 564 A.2d 1346, 1351-52 (Vt. 1989) ("wide latitude"); Miceikis v.
Field, 347 N.E.2d 320 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); Winsor C. Moore, Cross-Examining the
Incompetent Document Examiner, in TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 315, 320 (John J. Kennedy et al.
eds., 1963); see also EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 1-2 at 18 (2d ed. 1992).
189. See, e.g., Logan Ford & James H. Holmes, III, Exposure of Doctors' Venal Testimony,
TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 75 (1965).
190. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Comparative Law Analysis of the Standard for Admitting
Scientific Evidence: The United States Stands Alone, 42 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 15, 21-22 (1989).
191. Id. at 22.
192. Landsman, supra note 35, at 1173 n.132.
193. See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901).
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pion of one side."' 194 Leading contemporary commentators are level-
ing the identical criticism at expert testimony.' 95 The critics are not
merely alleging that financial interest biases experts at a subconscious
level; 96 they go further and aver outright fraud and perjury.197 Per-
haps more than any other factor, this suspicion of perjury helps
explain the extraordinary freedom accorded attorneys cross-examin-
ing expert witnesses. 198
The hearsay rule. Although the general contours of the hearsay
rule are consistent with the best evidence hypothesis,199 the worst evi-
dence principle provides the best explanation for many of the hard
cases in hearsay. The principle rationalizes not only controversial fea-
tures of the hearsay definition but also troublesome questions about
the hearsay exceptions.
One noteworthy feature of the hearsay definition is its inclusion
of written as well as oral statements. 2" One of the traditional justifi-
cations for the hearsay doctrine is akin to the rationale for the best
evidence rule: the possibility of error in oral transmission of informa-
tion.2° ' Just as an in-court witness could err in paraphrasing a docu-
ment, the witness might misstate the content of an out-of-court
assertion. Of course, this justification is inapplicable to writings; the
production of the writing eliminates the risk of an innocent misstate-
ment of its contents. Yet it is well-settled that the hearsay rule
extends to writings prepared out of court.202 The reduction of the
statement to writing does not remove the statement from the scope of
194. Id. at 53.
195. See MARGARET A. BERGER, PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY MECHANISMS FOR
DEALING WITH EXPERTS IN TOXIC TORT LITIGATION: A CRITIQUE AND PROPOSAL 8
(1991); PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1991); Peter W. Huber, Quoth the Maven, 23 REASON 41 (Nov. 1991).
196. See Michael H. Graham, Impeaching the Professional Expert Witness by a Showing of
Financial Interest, 53 IND. L.J. 35 (1977).
197. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique
from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554, 555 (1983).
198. This factor may also help account for the common-law ultimate fact prohibition. The
early judges at least purported to bar experts from testifying as to the ultimate issues in the
case. MCCORMICK, supra note 130, § 12. Most jurisdictions have now repealed that bar.
FED. R. EVID. 704. The kernel of truth underlying the bar was that an expert should not
"merely tell the jury what result to reach . I..." Id. at advisory committee's note. Allowing an
expert to do so would obviously be most dangerous when the expert is a venal witness, inclined
to bend the facts and scientific truths for the side paying the expert's fee.
199. Nance, supra note 3, at 286-89.
200. MCCORMICK, supra note 130, § 248.
201. EDWARD IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1001 at 250
(1987).
202. See MCCORMICK, supra note 130, § 248.
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the hearsay definition.20 3 The scope of the definition thus indicates
that the common-law judges were concerned about more than the in-
court witness' innocent mistakes. The breadth of the definition sug-
gests that judges also wanted to accord the opposing party an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant to test, inter alia,
the declarant's sincerity. 2"
Another feature of the hearsay definition carries the same sugges-
tion. The principal modern controversy surrounding the definition is
whether the definition should encompass implied statements, some-
times dubbed "Morgan hearsay. "205 The classic nineteenth century
English case, excerpted in almost all Evidence coursebooks, is Wright
v. Doe d. Tatham.2 °6 In that case, the question was whether a
deceased person had testamentary capacity when he executed his will.
The proponent of the will offered testimony that several of the dece-
dent's friends had written him serious letters. Baron Parke ruled that
the testimony amounted to implied statements by the friends, and
thus was subject to the hearsay rule. To begin with, the testimony
evidenced the friends' belief in the decedent's sanity; they would not
have performed the act of sending him serious letters if they had not
entertained that belief. Next, the proponent of the will was offering
the testimony as proof of the truth of that belief; the proponent in
effect contended that if the decedent's friends considered him compe-
tent, the decedent likely was competent. Wright can to be viewed as
authority for the proposition that the hearsay definition extends to
nonassertive conduct, actuated by a belief, when the conduct is
offered to prove the truth of the belief.2 7 Professor Morgan later
wrote approvingly of this expansion of the definition. 20 8 He argued
that the opponent needed an opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-
court actor to test the caliber of the actor's perception, memory, and
narrative ability.
However, when it came time to frame the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the drafters rejected Morgan's view; they opted to exclude
implied statements from the hearsay definition.20 9 Their reasoning is
significant. The drafters conceded Morgan's point that the evidence
203. United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331, 1343 (4th Cir. 1984).
204. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 201, § 1001 at 250-51.
205. Roger C. Park, "I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You": Implied Assertions as
Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L. REV. 783 (1990).
206. 7 Ad. & E. 313, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Ex. Ch. 1837).
207. CARLSON, AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 569-74.
208. See Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 214, 217 (1948).
209. FED. R. EvID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
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in question "is untested with respect to the perception, memory, and
narration ... of the actor . ,210 However, the drafters emphasized
that if the actor is willing to act on personal beliefs, for all practical
purposes their willingness to do so "eliminate[s] questions of sincer-
ity." '  The old bromide, "actions speak louder than words," per-
suaded the drafters. To their way of thinking, the actor's willingness
to act serves as an indicium of sincerity and, conversely, insurance
against possible perjury.21 2 Like the inclusion of written statements,
the exclusion of implied statements from the definition points to an
overriding concern about the prevention of fraud and perjury.
Similarly, the common-law stance on several of the longstanding
disputes over hearsay exceptions indicates an emphasis on insuring
subjective sincerity and precluding perjury. The controversy over the
excited or startled utterance exception is a case in point. Psycholo-
gists have taken the courts to task for recognizing this exception; for
decades psychologists have argued that emotional stress frequently
results in error and distortion.213 However, the courts have ada-
mantly upheld the exception, reasoning that when the declarant
speaks under the sway of a startling event, there is a strong inference
that the declarant is speaking sincerely. 214 Their fears of perjury
allayed, the common-law judges decided to include the excited utter-
ance doctrine within the list of hearsay exceptions.
In contrast, until the adoption of the Federal Rules,215 the com-
mon-law courts hesitated to recognize the present sense impression
exception.216 The courts acknowledged that the timing of a present
sense impression statement effectively eliminates doubts about the
quality of the declarant's memory. However, they rejected the con-
tention that the insurance of the caliber of the declarant's memory
warrants admitting the evidence: "In the minds of most common law
courts.., that contention missed the mark. The leading hearsay dan-
ger was insincerity, and the contemporaneity of the statement did not
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Imwinkelried, supra note 128, at 228 n.134.
213. Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence,
28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 437 (1928); I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay:
A Criticism of Present Law and The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV.
1, 28.
214. Mason Ladd, The Hearsay We Admit, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 271, 280 (1952).
215. FED. R. EvID. 803(1).
216. Jon R. Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay:
Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REV. 869, 875 (1981); Kathryn E. Wohlsen, The Present
Sense Impression Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1), 81 DICK. L.
REV. 347, 351 (1977).
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ensure the declarant's subjective sincerity. ' 21 7 Accordingly, until the
adoption of the Federal Rules, the exception was a distinct minority
view at common law. 218 As in the case of the recognition of the
excited utterance exception, the rejection of the present sense impres-
sion doctrine underscores that the courts' primary concern was insur-
ing subjective sincerity and forestalling its antithesis, perjury.2 19
5. PRIVILEGES
In the course of his argument for the best evidence hypothesis,
Professor Nance concedes that the hypothesis does not explain privi-
lege law.22° Privileges were fashioned to effectuate extrinsic social
policies such as the promotion of the attorney-client relationship.221
Like the best evidence hypothesis, the worst evidence principle fails to
account for the existence of privileges. However, unlike the former
hypothesis, the worst evidence principle is dramatically reflected in
the specific detail of the common law of privileges.
Although we sometimes use the expression "privilege" in the sin-
gular, in reality, the privilege umbrella includes three different types
of evidentiary doctrines. The paradigm is the true, absolute privilege
such as the one shielding the attorney-client relationship. If the privi-
lege attaches and there is neither a waiver nor an applicable special
exception, the protection of the privilege is absolute; no matter how
compelling the opposing party's need for the evidence may be, the
opponent cannot penetrate the shield of the privilege.222
Other privileges such as the normal work product protection are
conditional. As in the case of an absolute privilege, the rationale for
recognizing the privilege is extrinsic social policy. However, the pro-
tection is conditional or qualified in the sense that the opponent may
override the protection by showing a "substantial need" for the infor-
mation.2 23 The opponent's contemplated use of the information at
trial is simply one of the factors the judge weighs in assessing the
217. Imwinkelried, supra note 128, at 221.
218. Charles W. Quick, Hearsay, Excitement, Necessity and the Uniform Rules: A
Reappraisal of Rule 63(4), 6 WAYNE L. REV. 204, 206 (1960); Waltz, supra note 216, at 875.
219. See Imwinkelried, supra note 128, at 220-22.
220. Nance, supra note 3, at 229, 279, 294.
221. CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 731.
222. Id. at 750-51 (citing Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Ariz.,
881 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1989)).
223. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Some jurisdictions also recognize a conditional privilege for
confidential government information which does not qualify under the absolute privilege for
state or military secrets. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040(b)(2); CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF
SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 876-77 (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy,
617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
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extent of the opponent's need.2 24
Finally, there are analogous doctrines sometimes styled "quasi-
privileges. ' 225 This category includes the exclusionary rules for evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures,226 compromise statements
made during negotiations to settle civil claims, 227 and plea bargains.228
Here, too, the underlying rationale for the existence of the privilege is
an extrinsic policy; the courts developed these doctrines to affect
behavior outside the courtroom by removing disincentives for safety
improvements and settlement negotiations. Moreover, as in the case
of conditional privileges, the judge considers the party's contemplated
use of the evidence at trial in deciding whether to override the quasi-
privilege. The difference is that in the case of the quasi-privileges, the
intended trial use of the evidence is usually dispositive rather than
being merely a relevant factor.229 Thus, the prevailing view is that the
subsequent repair doctrine comes into play only when the proponent
of the evidence attempts to use testimony about the later repair as
proof of antecedent fault.23° If the proponent has any other theory of
logical relevance, tenable on the facts of the case, the evidence is
admissible. 231 Although the three types of privileges differ in many
respects, the law governing all three types reflects that prevention of
perjury and related evils is a paramount concern.
In the case of the absolute privileges, the reflection takes the form
of the well-recognized fraud exception to the scope of the privi-
leges. 232 For example, even if the attorney-client privilege would
otherwise attach to suppress the information in question, the opposing
party can defeat the privilege by showing that the client sought the
legal advice to facilitate the commission of a future fraud.233 The
exception has ancient lineage;234 and although the Federal Rules do
not expressly codify the exception, the Supreme Court recently reaf-
firmed the viability of the exception in federal practice. 235 When the
224. CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 889.
225. 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5213 (1978).
226. See FED. R. EVID. 407.
227. See FED. R. EVID. 408-09.
228. See FED. R. EvID. 410.
229. CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 889.
230. See FED. R. EvID. 407.
231. CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 893-95.
232. See James A. Gardner, The Crime or Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege,
47 A.B.A. J. 708 (1961).
233. MCCORMICK, supra note 130, § 95.
234. See id. § 95, n.2.
235. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989).
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extrinsic social policy underlying the privilege collides with the social
interest in preventing fraud, the privilege yields.
Many courts have also subjected conditional privileges such as
the work product protection to the fraud exception.23 6 Summarizing
the current state of the case law, one court asserted that every federal
court of appeals "which has considered the question has held or
assumed" that the exception is equally applicable to the work product
privilege. 7
Lastly, there are similar exceptions to some of the quasi-privi-
leges. For instance, after setting out the exclusionary rule for state-
ments made during plea bargaining negotiations, Federal Rule of
Evidence 410 states in pertinent part: "However, such a statement is
admissible ... (ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false state-
ment if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the
record and in the presence of counsel. 2 38 In the drafters' judgment,
the policy of facilitating plea bargaining is weighty enough to warrant
the protection of a legal privilege. Yet that policy has been
subordinated to the fundamental objective of curbing perjury.
Even this superficial review of evidentiary rules compels the con-
clusion that in formulating those rules, common-law jurisdictions
have been concerned-almost obsessed-with the prevention of per-
jury and kindred evils such as fraud and forgery. 239 That concern has
influenced virtually every area of evidentiary doctrine. In making the
threshold decision whether to permit a person to testify as a witness,
the early common-law judges were inclined to completely bar testi-
mony by any person with a significant motive for perjury. After
deciding to allow a person to take the witness stand, the judges
wanted to maximally deter the witness from committing perjury. To
that end, the judges fashioned rules which liberally admit evidence of
a witness' character trait of untruthfulness; if the witness is deter-
mined to give perjurious testimony, the witness must be prepared for
a frontal assault on his credibility. The preferential rules such as the
best evidence and hearsay doctrines operate to frustrate attempted
perjury or fraud, and many of their most controversial features are
explicable only under the worst evidence principle. Even the privi-
leges can be surmounted when they conflict with the primary interest
236. See CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 809 (citing In re Sealed Case,
676 F.2d 793, 811 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). But see BP Alaska Exploration v. Superior Ct., 245
Cal. Rptr. 682, 695 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); CARLSON, id. (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
867 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1989)); Whose Work Product Is It?, 9 CAL. LAW. 114 (Jan. 1990).
237. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 811 n.67.
238. FED. R. EvID. 410.
239. See Imwinkelried, supra note 128, at 219-22.
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in preventing fraud. In summary, although the explanatory power of
the best evidence principle exceeds that of the jury control hypothesis,
the power of both pales in comparison to the rationalizing force of the
worst evidence principle.
IV. CONCLUSION
It would be a mistake to overstate the case for the worst evidence
principle. For example, it would be exaggerated to claim that every
common-law evidentiary rule is reducible to the worst evidence prin-
ciple. Ours is not a civil-law system in which courts systematically
endeavor to deduce their decisions from a comprehensive body of
doctrine. Rather, the common law, including the law of evidence, has
gradually developed by an evolutionary process spanning centuries.
240
As Holmes cautioned, in the study of the common law, a page of
history is often worth more than a volume of logic.24 ' The genesis of
evidentiary law was such a lengthy process, impacted by so many
influences,242 that it would be impossible to reduce it to a single
organizing principle.
In addition, it must be conceded that Professor Nance's best evi-
dence hypothesis may still be the soundest organizing principle for the
legal sufficiency rules in the common law of evidence.24 a One of the
most important sufficiency rules is the "missing witness" doctrine.244
Suppose, for example, that it is obvious from the facts in a case that
the defendant's employee has firsthand knowledge of a key event but
the defendant nevertheless fails to call the employee as a trial witness.
Given the defendant's special relationship with the "missing witness,"
the trier of fact should carefully scrutinize the sufficiency of the
defendant's evidence. Both in his original piece245 and in a more
recent work,246 Professor Nance advances a powerful argument that
the best evidence principle supplies the soundest rationale for the
"missing witness" doctrine.
Further, there are other areas of law which reflect a concern
about the prevention of perjury and fraud. For example, the Statute
240. For a discussion of the common law's development of the modem promissory estoppel
doctrine, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CONTRACTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 97-99 (4th ed. 1988).
241. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
242. Nance, supra note 3, at 296.
243. Id. at 290.
244. See Dale A. Nance, Missing Evidence, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 831 (1991).
245. Nance, supra note 3, at 290.
246. See generally Nance, supra note 244.
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of Frauds still plays a prominent role in both Contract 247 and Prop-
erty248 law. In both bodies of law, the parol evidence rule also
manifests the policy of precluding untruthful testimony.249
However, when the focus shifts to the admissibility rules of com-
mon-law evidence, the stress on the prevention of pejury and fraud is
even more pronounced-so marked that the worst evidence hypothe-
sis is the best explanatory principle. As we have seen, the historical
evidence supports that hypothesis. Moreover, the hypothesis has
superior explanatory utility. The hypothesis not only rationalizes
more doctrinal areas of evidentiary law than either competing princi-
ple; the hypothesis also helps account for some of the most trouble-
some aspects of those areas, such as the favorable treatment of
testimony about the character trait of untruthfulness.
The conclusion that the worst evidence hypothesis is the best
organizing principle is of more than academic interest. That conclu-
sion has profound implications for the future of American evidence
law. As noted at the outset of this article, the identification of an
organizing principle is critical for several reasons. One reason is that
if such a principle is identified but later discredited on some basis such
as empirical research, the whole body of law animating that principle
must be reexamined.25 ° It is, of course, possible that a new, alterna-
tive rationale can be discovered to uphold the extant body of law.
Common-law courts often resort to the technique of post hoc rational-
ization. 251 However, absent the presentation of a convincing, new jus-
tification for the existing doctrines, a wholesale revision may be
necessary.
Suppose that in a discussion of the necessity for reforming evi-
dence law, the starting point was the jury control hypothesis. On that
supposition, the necessity for reform would be highly debatable. The
underlying assumption of the jury control hypothesis is that lay jurors
often have difficulty critically evaluating evidence. It is an understate-
247. FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 240, at ch. 3.
248. See JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 160-61, 220, 237-38, 387-89 (3d ed. 1989).
249. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 124, §§ 7.2-.6.
250. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
251. The development of the prevailing Frye standard for the admissibility of scientific
evidence is a perfect illustration. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia handed
down the Frye decision in 1923. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye,
the court announced that an expert may base her testimony on a scientific theory only if the
theory is generally accepted within the relevant scientific circles. At the time of the decision,
the holding was pure ipse dixit; the court "neither cited authority nor offered an explanation
for adopting the general acceptance test .... ." PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-5, at 10 (1986). Subsequent courts have
endeavored to develop a rationale for the general acceptance standard. Id. § 1-5(A).
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ment to say that that hypothesis has not been thoroughly discredited.
In the 1970s, a large number of courts denied demands for jury trial
in complex cases on the ground that the difficulty of the case exceeded
the typical lay juror's capacity.25 2 In the 1980s, a controversy arose
over the relaxation of the standards for admitting expert testimony.25 a
One of the contentions frequently voiced by the opponents of relaxed
standards was that lay jurors cannot separate the wheat from the chaff
of expert testimony. Research into the question of jury competence is
ongoing,254 and that research may eventually establish that the fears
of juror incapacity are well-founded.
Change the starting point in the discussion of the need for
reform; begin with the premise of the best evidence principle. With
this premise, the case for major reform is even weaker. Recent devel-
opments have arguably strengthened the case for the rationalist pref-
erences underlying such exclusionary rules as the best evidence and
opinion doctrines. The past two decades have witnessed the advent of
the so-called "documents" case 25--complex civil cases in which the
relevant documents may number in the tens of millions.256 This type
of litigation has greatly magnified the risk of relying on a witness'
paraphrase of dispositive language in writings. Professor Nance's
case for the best evidence rule is stronger than ever before. Moreover,
there have been startling revelations of significant error margins in
scientific analysis. 2 7 These revelations lend more substance to the
preference underlying the opinion prohibition. The epistemic consid-
erations informing the best evidence principle have certainly not been
discredited.
In contrast, to a significant degree, the fears inspiring the worst
evidence principle have been debunked. It is true that some commen-
tators still describe our system as "perjury-plagued. ' 258 However, the
252. Imwinkelried, supra note 197, at 563.
253. Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding
Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law Courts,
51 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1989).
254. See, e.g., Neil J. Vidmar, Foreword: Empirical Research and the Issue of Jury
Competence, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1989).
255. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & THEODORE Y. BLUMOFF, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY:
STRATEGY AND TACTICS § 2:29 (1986).
256. Id. § 1:01, at 2.
257. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Debate in the DNA Cases Over the Foundation for the
Admission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance of Human Error as a Cause of Forensic
Misanalysis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 19, 25-27 (1991) (collecting the studies).
258. See Barry Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in Determining
Credibility in a Perjury-Plagued System, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 917 (1975).
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consensus among legal psychologists 25 9 and experienced litigators26° is
that perjury is a relatively rare phenomenon. By a wide margin, mis-
recollection appears to be the more important cause of testimonial
error.26' Empirical research has undermined the underlying assump-
tions of the worst evidence principle to a much greater extent than it
has called into question either the doubts inspiring the jury control
hypothesis or the epistemic concerns supporting the best evidence
principle. Long ago Evans262 and Bentham263 took the position that
the early courts had overestimated the magnitude of the problem of
witness perjury, and the contemporary research seems to vindicate
their position. The upshot is that the identification of the worst evi-
dence hypothesis as the organizing principle for evidence law adds
special impetus to the reform of evidence law.
The evidentiary doctrines resting most squarely on the worst evi-
dence principle must be rethought. The survivor's evidence compe-
tency rules have long been a target of criticism.26 The critics have
argued that on balance, the statutes produce more injustice than they
prevent; according to the critics, in the typical case, the application of
the statute results in the suppression of truthful testimony about a
valid claim rather than in the preclusion of perjury about a fabricated
claim. The empirical research undermining the worst evidence princi-
ple lends new force to that criticism.
Serious consideration should also be given to the modification of
the authentication requirement. If forgery were rampant, the require-
ment would be justifiable; but it is doubtful that forgery is widespread.
Some jurisdictions have already moved in this direction and generally
presume the authenticity of exhibits proffered at trial.2 65
Likewise, the rule that routinely admits character evidence of
untruthfulness should be subjected to careful scrutiny. The inconsis-
tency of that rule with the treatment of character evidence on the
merits is obvious. The inconsistency might be defensible if, as the
early judges assumed, perjury was commonplace. However, that
assumption is suspect. It may be time to eradicate the inconsistency
by sharply restricting the admission of character evidence on a credi-
259. Imwinkelried, supra note 128, at 224.
260. See Ladd, supra note 214, at 286.
261. Imwinkelried, supra note 128, at 224.
262. See Landsman, supra note 35, at 1166.
263. See id. at 1179.
264. Roy R. Ray, Dead Man's Statutes, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1963).
265. See, e.g., McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 928 n.20 (3d Cir. 1985)




At first, it may be disturbing to come to grips with the proposi-
tion that many evidentiary rules rest on the unflattering assumption
that deliberate perjury is a common occurrence. However, the
acceptance of that proposition produces a fascinating paradox. As
stated above, modem research has discredited that assumption to a
greater extent than it has effectively impeached the premises of either
the jury control or the best evidence hypothesis. The identification of
the worst evidence hypothesis as the organizing principle cuts most
strongly in favor of the liberalization of American evidence law.
Despite the changes effected by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
United States still has the most complex, restrictive set of evidentiary
rules in the world.2 6 7 Paradoxically, the acceptance of the worst evi-
dence principle-the hypothesis resting on pessimistic Hobbesian psy-
chology-gives us the greatest cause to be optimistic about the future
reform of evidence law.
V. EPILOGUE
After drafting this article, I turned my attention to another writ-
ing project. While researching that project, I happened to reread the
American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence, adopted in
1942.268 The code is one of the most revolutionary documents in the
history of American evidence law; the code proposed sweeping away
many of the common-law restrictions on the admission of logically
relevant evidence. 26 9 The Foreword attributes many "of the deformi-
ties" in the common law of evidence "to the obsession of early judges
... that perjury can be prevented by exclusionary rules.27 ° In the next
breath, though, the Foreword attacks that obsession and argues that
"[n]o rational procedure" would "sanction an exclusionary rule sup-
ported only by its supposed efficacy to hinder or prevent false testi-
mony." '271 On the very same page, the Foreword calls for "radical
reformation of the law of evidence. '272 Given the Foreword's recog-
nition of the worst evidence principle, it is no accident that the code is
so thoroughly reformist.
266. See Friedman, supra note 69.
267. CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 1.
268. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942).
269. CARLSON ET AL., AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 18, at 22.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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